CRIMINAL PROVISIONS OF THE SECURITIES ACT AND ANALOGIES TO SIMILAR CRIMINAL STATUTES by MACINTYRE, MALCOLM A.
CRIMINAL PROVISIONS OF THE SECURITIES ACT AND
ANALOGIES TO SIMILAR CRIMINAL STATUTES
MALCOLM A. MacINTYREt
IN common with previous legislative attempts to safeguard public par-
ticipation in security offerings, the Federal Securities Act of 1933 in-
cludes criminal provisions designed especially to inflict punishment upon
those malefactors who no longer possess property from which defrauded
investors can seek satisfaction. By Section 24 criminal lability is im-
posed upon
(1) "Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of this title, or
the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission under authority
thereof"; or
(2) "Any person who willfully, in a registration statement filed under this title,
makes any untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state any material
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein
not misleading ..."1
The acts coming within class (1), though plentifully specified in other
provisions of the statute, are either clear-cut in nature or, when occur-
ring under different circumstances, are defined in terms of the acts con-
templated in class (2). Thus no new problems need arise from pro-
hibiting, as unlawful, the use of the mails or interstate commerce to
offer for sale, sell, or deliver after sale any security as to which no
registration statement is in effect or which is not accompanied or pre-
ceded by a prospectus meeting the requirements of the Act.' A similar
prohibition against prospectuses seems likewise uneventful legally, how-
ever important practically.3 A provision making unlawful the affixing
of any signature to a registration statement without the authority of the
purported signer requires no comment,' nor does the provision that it is
unlawful for anyone to represent that the registration statement is true
and accurate and not misleading because it has been filed or is in effect
or has not given rise to a stop order.' Equally unequivocal is the state-
ment that it is unlawful to describe a security for a consideration from
t Sterling Fellow, Yale School of Law, 1932-1933.
1. P. L. No. 22, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) § 24. The penalty upon conviction is a
fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.
2. Id. §§ 5 (a) (1) (2), 5 (b) (2).
3. Id. § 5 (b) (1).
4. Id. § 6 (a).
5. Id. § 23. On the use of the stop order by the Federal Trade Commission, see Ro-
dell, Regulation of Securities by the Federal Trade Commission (1933) 43 Yssx L. J. 272.
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an issuer, underwriter or dealer without disclosing such consideration.6
Some acts declared unlawful' seem already made so by statutes now in
force relating to the use of the mails to defraud,s but prohibition as un-
lawful also is made to extend to use of the mails to engage in that which
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon a purchaser,9 and to obtaining
money or property "by means of any untrue statement of a material fact
or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading."' 0
The acts embraced within class (2) are the more important both
legally and practically. The pith of their definition is the consequence
placed upon an untrue statement of a material fact or the omission to
state any material fact . . . necessary to make the statements not mis-
leading." In this'lies the core of criminal liability under the Act. It is,
in fact, the heart of the whole statute, being, with qualifications differing
from those used in its application to crihinal liability, the main basis for
civil liability for prospectuses 12 and registration statements.3 An un-
true statement of a material fact has always been an ingredient of actions
for fraudulent misrepresentation, and what is material has been, and
presumably will continue to be, determined by reference to the standard
of the r.easonable man. The Act affects this situation only to the extent
that the Federal Trade Commission may, under the powers granted it,
facilitate this determination. If the Commission closely regulates the
facts required to be stated in a registration statement, juries need merely
take the responsibility for deciding whether, if some required facts
have been omitted, the omitted facts are material. But in exacting pen-
alties for failure to include in registration statements facts necessary to
make the statements therein not misleading, the Act establishes new bases
of criminal liability and requires new determinations in standards of
reasonable conduct. Juries must now particularize statements that are
misleading and determine inclusions necessary to render them not mis-
leading. In this respect the Act is a legal jig-saw puzzle, whose pieces
are labeled either "misleading material statements" or "correctives to the
6. Id. § 17 (b).
7. Id. § 17 (a) (1).
S. See p. 262 and note 53, infra.
9. Securities Act, supra note 1, § 17 (a) (3).
10. Id. § 17 (a) (2).
11. Here, as in the case of acts falling within class (1), the qualification that the action
must have been taken "willfully" raises no new or difficult legal problems. Cf. Legis. (1933)
33 COL. L. Rxv. 1220, 12.44. The similar restriction of the prohibitions under the second
part of Section 24 to registration statements does not seem to create any additional legal
questions.
12. Securities Act, supra note 1, § 12 (2).
13. Id. § 11.
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misleading statements," and whose sizes, shapes and fittings are undeter-
mined.
For its solution one must turn to a consideration of the rules which
have been set up by other statutes and their application over a period of
years. Criminal statutes predicating liability upon false and misleading
prospectuses have abundant representation upon the statute books of
this country, state and national, and of England. The controlling
English statute is the Larceny Act of 1861,11 which imposes criminal li-
ability upon any director or officer of a corporatipn who
".... shall make, circulate or publish . . . any written statement or account,
which he shall know to be false in any material particular . . . with intent to
induce any person . . . to intrust or advance any property to such body cor-
porate or public company . . .-:5
This statute received its initial interpretation 6 in the case of Rex v.
Kylsan" and was there construed as meaning that a prospectus may be
tested as a whole and the authority responsible for it rendered criminally
liable if it is misleading by the impression it creates in the reasonable
average man or by the inference he would naturally draw from it.
The defendant, Baron Kylsant of Carmathen, was chairman of the
Royal Mail Steam Packet Company which in 1931 was, if there be
included all subsidiaries either owned or controlled by it, one of the larg-
est shipping companies in the world. It has been estimated that 2,600,-
000 tons of shipping, thirty-five companies, and far more than £66,000,-
000 of capital are involved in the pyramid of maritime interests capped
14. 24 & 25 Vicr. c. 96, § 84 (1861).
15. Cf. the criminal liability provision ofthe English Companies Act of 1929 which is
applicable to non-chartered companies: "If any person in any return, report, certificate,
balance sheet, or other document, required by . . . this Act . . . , willfully makes a state-
ment false in any material particular, knowing it to be false, he shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor . . ." 19 & 20 GEo. V, c. 23, § 362 (1929).
16. Criminal prosecutions under this statute have been rare. Rex v. Lawson, [1905)
1 K. B. 541, turned, not upon any consideration of falsity in statement, for there were
direct positive falsehoods, but upon whether or not the defendant was a "manager" within
the purview of Section 84. Only one case, and that a civil one, was referred to by judge
or counsel in the trial of the Kylsant case, which is discussed at length infra. Aaron's
Reef v. Twiss, [1896] A. C. 273, wherein the defendants successfully defended an actionk
to enforce a subscription contract brought on the grounds of inducement to enter the
contract through a fraudulent prospectus which did not disclose the terms on which the
plaintiff company bought its properties and concessions.
17. 23 Crim. App. 83 (1931), aff'g trial court judgment rendered July 30, 1931. There
are no official English reports of original criminal trials. Informal reports of this trial
were given in the London Times, July 21-25, 28-31, 1931. There is available, however,
an official Transcript of Trial, a copy of which is to be found in the Yale Law Library.
References will be made to this as the Kylsant Transcript. The Kylsant case is noted in
(1932) 45 HARv. L. Rav. 1078.
[Vol. 43
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
by the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company."8 A man of exceptional
personality, great industry and fine background, 9 Lord Kylsant had for
the most part personally created this great concern. Moreover, he was
not only chairman of the Royal Mail but also chairman of or director in
about forty shipping companies, and at one time or another a member of
Parliament, President of the London Chamber of Commerce, and Presi-
dent of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce of the British Empire.
Socially, equal distinction had come his way-admission to the peerage,
Lord Lieutenant of Hereford, Vice-Admiral of North Wales, and Vice-
Chairman of the Representative Body of the Church of Wales.
Superficially the Royal Mail Company was prospering in the period of
1921 to 1928; actually it was not making a trading profit from year to
year. The public and investors would be confronted, if information was
sought, by a pleasant series of dividend percentages and rather esoteric
financial accounts."0 That such a policy of nondisclosure was deliber-
ately followed by Lord Kylsant may be surmised from his testimony at
the trial where he very emphatically stated that "We have never prac-
tically told the shareholders how the profit and loss account is made
up." 2' That was indeed a policy to which strict adherence was paid, and
since the Company was not within the purview of the Companies Act 22
18. See (1931) 112 THE ECONOMIST 300; Kylsant Transcript, 267; London Times,
June 12, 1930, at 14, 19.
19. An article in the N. Y. Times, July 26, 1931, at IX-2, not only recounts the
fact that the Philipses, the family of Lord Kylsant, had held a baronetcy since the time
of Edward I, but also that Lord Kylsant could trace his ancestry to both the Emperor
Maximum and Vortigen, King of the Bretons.
20. Thus ee MOODY'S IDusTRALs (1930) 2917, where there is given a skeletonized
comparative balance sheet which, on the liability side, contains a vaguely important item
"sundry balances" varying in extent between $7,500,000 and $13,000,000 over a period of
years. No specifications as to the ramified interests of the company, are given, and the
only contingent liability disclosed is that of the guaranty of $25,000,000 of White Star
Preference shares. The 59 Debentures floated on the strength of the prospectus that
led to Kylsant's conviction are given a rating of A. To a similar effect, see POOR'S INDUS-
TRIALS (1931) 2945.
21. Kylsant Transcript, 272.
22. Since the Company operated under a Royal Charter, it was exempt from all pro-
visions of the Companies Acts of 1908 and 1929.
By Sections 35, 38, 40, and 354 of the Companies Act of 1929, supra note 15, there
are required in every prospectus certain specific disclosures, e.g., the amount to be paid
any promoter and the consideration therefor; the date and parties to every material contract
entered into by a company in the ordinary course of business or within two years of the
issuance of the prospectus, and the locaton of a copy of every such contract; profit and loss
accounts for the preceding three years and the accounts of any business which a com-
pany contemplates purchasing. By Sections 123 and 124 the directors of a company must
each year furnish to the stockholders a profit and loss account and a particularized balance
sheet, the latter being positively required to contain "its liabilities and assets, together
with such particulars as are necessary to disclose the general nature of the liabilities and
the asets of the company and to distinguish between the amounts respectively of the
1933
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its only duty, so far as its accounts were concerned, was that contained
in the Royal Charter of 1839, under which, with modifications, it oper-
ated and which provided that previous to every yearly general meet-
ing an account should be prepared by the "court of directors" of the
debts and assets of the corporation with an account of the profits made
in the year ending the thirty-first of December preceding such general
meeting.23 Little did the stockholders of this Company or the public
realize from the published accounts from 1921 onwards, and more es-
pecially those of 1926 and 1927,24 that the Company was not making
nearly sufficient trading profit to pay its dividends, but was only able
to do so because of vast hidden reserves on which it drew."' These
hidden reserves were of two classes-those which were refunds from
payments made to the government, such as £800,000 on excess profits
taxes repaid in installments between 1921 and 1927,2" and those which
were retained on the books at all times, no payment ever being made from
them. These latter masqueraded in the accounts under the misleading lia-
bility "Sundry balances, accounts not closed and debts owing by the Co." 2 -7
Some £1,100,000 of a £2,200,000 excess profits duty reserve fund built
up during the war was secreted under this liability item and never drawn
upon for payment to the government, but utilized to the extent of £800,-
000 for the benefit of different profit and loss accounts and £300,000 for
investment depreciation. Other reserve funds carried on the books but
never openly divulged, from which transfers to profit and loss were made,
were an income tax reserve account, a corporation profits tax reserve
account and a fleet depreciation fund.29  During this same period of
1921 to 1927 debenture interest, dividends on preferred stock, and divi-
dends on the ordinary stock never lower than 4% were paid, undoubt-
edly an impossibility without the use of these secret reserves. 30  The
fixed assets and of the floating assets, and shall state how the value of the fixed assets
have been arrived at."
23. Kylsant Transcript, 10.
24. The balance sheets and profit and loss accounts for both 1926 and 1927 are fully
set out in (1931) 85 Tnn AccouxNT r 110, 111.
25. It appeared conclusively from uncontradicted evidence at the trial that between
1921 and 1927 £3,800,000 in hidden reserves had been brought into the profit and loss ac-
counts. Kylsant Transcript, 134, 430.
26. Id. at 151.
27. Id. at 134, 430.
28. Id. at 150, 436.
29. Id. at 33.
30. In each year there was paid 4Y2% on £1,400,000 of 1st Debentures and 5% on
£3,100,000 Debentures amounting to £218,000; then 5% on £900,000 Preferred Stock and
6Y2% on £2,900,000 Preferred Stock totaling £233,500; and additionally at least 4% on
£5,000,000 ordinary stock equalling £200,00. These minimum yearly payments amounted in
total to £651,500. Inasmuch as the yearly profit and loss balances into which reserves
were brought and from which these charges were primarily paid were, after deduction of
operating costs and depreciation, £668,400 in 1921, £725,000 in 1922, £779,114 in 1923,
[Vol. 43
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
only hint as to their use was contained in the phrase "adjustment of
taxation reserves" which first appeared in the profit and loss account for
1925"' and later in that for 1926 and 1927, in all of which years there
was the statement "Balance for the year including dividends on shares
in allied and other companies, adjustment of taxation reserves, less de-
preciation of fleet, etc."
It was by reason of this nondisclosure that the government brought
its first two charges alleging that Lord Kylsant had, with intent to de-
ceive the stockholders of the Company, published annual reports in
1927 and 1928 which concealed the true financial position of the business
and which he knew were false in a material particular. 32 The defense
rested upon two points: first, that the reserves in question were free for
use for the first time in the particular year in which they were trans-
ferred;" 3 and secondly, that their transference to profit and loss, if not
their amount, was disclosed by the phrase "adjustment of taxation re-
serves. '' 34 The common jury, sitting under Mr. Justice Wright in the
Central Criminal Court of London-the historic old Bailey,-was im-
pressed by this defense to the point of acquittal despite the obviously
misleading nature of the accounts wherein published reserves were de-
creased little or none and the use of secret reserves was disclosed only
in the accountant's language and not the layman's.
Different considerations entered into the prospectus charge. The
Company in 1928 found itself badly in need of money. There was an
overdraft of £466,000 with Barclay's Bank and £471,000 with Coutt's.35
Further liquid resources were needed to complete the new building of the
Company on Leadenhall Street, London. Secret reserves and possible
non-recurring refunds had been practically exhausted. Lord Kylsant
therefore determined to issue £2,000,000 of 5% Debentures. The pros-
pectus, prominently published to attract subscribers, stated inter alia
that36
"Although this company in common with other shipping companies has suf-
fered from the depression in the shipping industry, the audited accounts of the
company show that during the past ten years the average annual balance avail-
able (including profits of the Insurance Fund) after providing for depreciation
£772,829 in 1924, 1731,103 in 1925, £439,212 in 1926 and £657,000 in 1927, it is apparent
that the capital charges could not have been paid without access to these special re-
funds and reserves.
31. Kylsant Transcript, 28, 362.
32. For these charges, see id. at 3.
33. See id. at 77, 78, 79, 80, 390.
34. See id. at 55, 376.
35. Id. at 448.
36. This prospectus appeared in full in the London Times, July 3, 1928. It was later
substantially reprinted in (1931) 85 T=n AccOUNTANT 112.
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and interest on existing debenture stocks, has been sufficient to pay the in-
terest on the present issue more than five times over..."
Such a glowing prospectus could not and did not fail to induce an
oversubscription by a public emotionally stirred by a securities boom
then in progress37 and ignorant of the financial legerdemain whereby re-
serves and secret refunds now exhausted had substantially contributed
to the "average annual balance" and ordinary dividends referred to in
this optimistic document.18
There is no doubt that this prospectus was issued under the personal
direction of Lord Kylsant and he assumed responsibility for its wording
upon the witness stand, but he denied that he ever had an intention to
deceive or defraud any stockholder or creditor." The defense rested
its case upon the fact that the Larceny Act did not penalize economy of
thought, that every statement made in the prospectus was true and would
not be made false by any additional disclosures, that is to say, no pos-
sible additional information could have altered the fact that the dividends
were paid and that the "average annual balance available" was at least
£500,000, as stated. Sir John Simon, in his closing speech for the de-
fense, upheld the practice of maintaining secret reserves and attempted
to refute the possibility of an intent to defraud or deceive by reference
to Lord Kylsant's avowed belief that the depression was cyclical, that
affairs were on the mend in 1927 as shown by the increased earnings,
and that the most which could be imputed to Lord Kylsant was mis-
judgment. The Attorney-General emphasized the careful way in which
the prospectus had been drawn and contended that the document was
false in a material particular in that it created in the minds of potential
investors, considering the integrity of the Company, a false impression
upon which they relied to their misfortune. Mr. Justice Wright, in sum-
ming up to the jury, accepted the interpretation of the statute advanced
by the Attorney-General and charged them specifically, in interpreting
the statutory words "false in a material particular," that "the docu-
ment as a whole may be false not because of what it states but because
of what it does not state, because of what it implies."40  To the jurors,
the conclusion seemed irresistible that under Lord Kylsant's direction
the prospectus had been carefully worded in such a manner as to create
a distinctly false impression. The accused was accordingly convicted
and sentenced to prison for the term of one year.
Appeal was heard in November, 1931, before the Court of Criminal
Appeal. The grounds of appeal were that there was no evidence to
37. See (1931) 41 EcoN. J. 577-583. According to the London Times of August 27,
1928, stocks were at their highest point since the War.
38. See the London Times, July 4, 1928, at 24.
39. Kylsant Transcript, 260, 261.
40. Id. at 428.
[Vol. 43
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
support the verdict, that there had been misdirection of the jury, and
that sentence was excessive. But the appeal was dismissed.4' Mr.
Justice Avory, giving the opinion of the court, upheld the direction of the
trial judge that a prospectus which created a false impression was a docu-
ment "false in a material particular" and declared that the evidence
given was adequate to support a finding that the prospectus did convey
a false impression. The precise words of the learned judge are highly
important:
"the prospectus was false in a material particular in that it conveyed a false
impression, the falsity in this case consisting in putting before intending in-
vestors as material upon which they could exercise a judgment about the exist-
ing position of the company, figures which apparently disclose the existing
position but, in fact, conceal it. In other words, the document implied that the
company was in a sound financial position, and that a prudent investor could
safely invest in its debentures. This implication arises particularly from the
statement that the dividends have been regularly paid over a term of years, al-
though times have been bad, a statement which is entirely misleading when
the fact that they were paid not out of current earnings but out of earnings in
the abnormal war period is omitted." 42
The opinion then went on to find that
"If there was evidence that the document was false in the particulars already
indicated, there was ample evidence upon which the jury could find that the
appellant knew of its falsity, knowing as he did of the means by which the
dividends had been paid; and it is not and cannot be disputed that the pros-
pectus was published with intent to induce persons to entrust or advance
money to the company which was sufficient to satisfy the section. ..,43
The application for reduction of sentence was peremptorily denied.44
Manifestly, the impact of this conviction upon the business world was
as important as its effect upon legal circles.45  Everywhere it was hailed
41. Rex v. Kylsant, supra note 17.
42. Id. at 99.
43. Id. at 100.
44. London Times, Nov. 5, 1931, at 12.
45. It has been assumed that one effect of the Kylsant case was to set the civil law
for actionable misrepresentation. Ske Note (1932) 45 H-AIv. L. REv. 1078, 1079, n. 7.
But although the judges may have felt that the civil law supported them and have been
considerably swayed by consideration of the fiduciary-relationship doctrine derived from
the superior knowledge and predominant position of one party to the transaction, it does
not follow that a necessary corollary of the Kylsant case would be the subjection of Lord
Kylsant to civil liability. That would be so only if the civil law allowed the "false im-
pression" test in all fraudulent misrepresentation cases, or imposed a duty of disclosure not
only upon promoter-directors but upon directors generally, so as to include directors of
concerns engaging in sales of stock to prospective investors through prospectuses. It is
doubtful, however, if the English civil law entertains either of these propositions. See
Stiebel, Inferences from a Prospectus (1932) 48 L. Q. REv. 43.
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as a step in the right direction. The staidest of financial journafs were
warmest in their praises.46  The accountancy profession and the bar
approved the results.47 General opinion was, in fact, inclined to feel
that, happy deterrent that this case might be, even further anticipatory
preventive measures should be embodied in the law. The Stock Ex-
change in London favored making it obligatory upon directors of public
companies to disclose in accounts the extent to which reserves are drawn
upon to assist the profit and loss account, since it was felt that purely
trading operations should not be veiled by special credits.4" Account-
ants were of much the same view and suggested additionally that
chartered companies should be on the same footing as other public com-
panies.49 Such criticism had been broached before, notably at the time
when the Greene Committee was laboring upon the legislation which be-
came the Companies Act of 1929. That Act does require that pros-
pectuses shall contain a record of the profits and dividends of a com-
pany for the three years preceding the issuance, but has no provisions
concerning the manner in which the profit statement shall be drawn
up."' This was deemed an unfortunate omission at that time"' and,
inevitably, it appeared even more unfortunate after the Kylsant case had
focused attention upon accounting practice.52
In the United States there existed before the enactment of the Federal
Securities Act a number of statutes, state and federal, within the scope
of which the malpractices of corporate directors and officers might fall
or do fall. A federal law prohibits the use of the mails to defraud. 3
A violation of this statute can be established by proof that money was
obtained in the sale of corporate stock through false representations,5 4
and directors might well be so connected with such a violation as to be-
come liable to conviction. But such liability seems limited
to direct false representations-at most, false as the result of
legal implications, i. e. dividends paid imply dividends earned."" Unless,
46. See (1931) 113 Tmx ECONOMTsT 874.
47. See (1931) 75 SoL. J. 594, 595; (1931) 85 THE ACCOUNTANT 629.
48. N. Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1931, at 31.
49. See (1931) 85 THE ACCOuNTANT 193; id. at 249.
50. Companies Act, supra note 15, Fourth Schedule, Part II.
51. (1926) 102 THE EcoNO MsT 1132.
52. It is to be noted, however, that although an interpretation of the relevant sections
of the Companies Act, supra note 15, was not involved in the Kylsqnt decision, Mr. Jus-
tice Wright expressed the opinion that they could not be construed to allow "secret re-
serves," i. e. surplus hidden under such a liability item as "sundry balances." To the
same effect see (1931) 172 LAw Thxms 161.
53. 35 STAT. 1130 (1909), 18 U. S. C. § 338 (1926).
54. Gold v. United States, 36 F. (2d) 16 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929); Corliss v. United States,





then, the "scheme to defraud" to which the statute refers includes
within its substance not a document such as a prospectus, truthful in
itself yet false in impression, but a document which contains a state-
ment that is false, no liability will be imposed. Whether or not public
pressure, prosecuting fervor, and judicial acquiescence can bring about
an extension of interpretation of "scheme to defraud" so as to broaden
liability along the lines suggested by the Kylsant case is problematical.
There are also two types of state laws which presumably could sup-
port convictions of directors responsible for prospectuses that are truth-
fully deceptive. One consists of those laws directed to the general pro-
hibition of false statements to affect the market price of securities.
These laws are very broad and in two states could, it is submitted, lead
to the conviction of many directors who have subscribed to a prospectus
for a stock issue which would be minutely truthful and yet grossly mis-
leading, since all that is required is an intent to affect the market price of
a security by circulating or publishing any "misleading writing."5 6 The
other three states having this type of law restrict liability to "false state-
ments" or "fraudulent devices' and the present state of judicial inter-
pretation, leads one at most to hope rather than to assert that liability so
phrased covers fraud by misleading truth. No prosecutions have been
initiated which raise the issue but the possibilities of broad interpretation
are latent. The other type of statute, now lacking in only six states,58
is that prohibiting false advertisements. 9 For present purposes it may
be stated that if the reasonable assumption is made that a prospectus
is an advertisement, then this type of statute will apply. Under it, liabil-
ity is extended to "any assertion, representation, or statement of fact
which is untrue, deceptive or misleading." While, no doubt, there is no
possibility of imposing liability by testing the advertisement and pros-
pectus as a whole, at least statements it contains do not have to be proved
false, but merely misleading, and it would seem that because of this fact
prosecutors have and have had a very handy weapon, as yet little used,
with which to attack those who would deceive the investing public.
In addition to these state laws there are the statutes of twenty-four
56. 5 Nav. Coap. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) § 10529; WAsir. REv. STAT. (Remington, 1932)
§ 2622.
57. N. D. Com'. LAWS ANN. (1913) § 9787; OxrA. Com. STAT. (Harlow, 1931) § 2105;
S. D. Comn. LAws (1929) § 3995.
58. Colo., Del., Ga., Me., Miss., N. M.
59. This legislation was first advocated by PRINTER'S Izu= and the "model statute"
there proposed, directed to the drastic prohibition of untrue advertising without refer-
ence to knowledge of its untruth or intent to mislead, has been adopted in many states,
while other states have adopted variations of this "model statute" which require knowledge
of the deception or intent to deceive. The statutes are collected and discussed in detail
in Comment (1927) 36 YAa:E L. J. 1155.
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states which impose directly rather broad criminal liability upon direct-
ors and officers responsible for the issuance of false prospectuses.
These statutes are divisble into two broad categories: first, those which,
irrespective of divergent requirements, or lack of them, as to intent or
knowledge, impose liability only for direct false statements contained in
a prospectus; and second, those which, likewise without consideration of
intent or knowledge requirements, impose liability for a prospectus that
is, as a whole, false by its impression, as well as for one containing a
positive false statement.
In the first category are sixteen state statutes of fifteen states.10 All
these laws restrict liability to prospectuses containing statements which
are false,61 thus by their terms barring any broad liability through
analogy to the wording of the English statute referring to prospectuses
"false in a material particular." It is of course also true that the sta-
tutes in this category vary considerably in other respects. Ten require
no intent to deceive or defraud.2 Of these ten, three contain specific
provisions that the statement either is intended to, or does affect or en-
hance or depress the market or real value of securities in the company
concerned,63 while all but one require that the publishing or concurring
in the publishing of the prospectus must be done "knowingly."64  Six
statutes within this first category postulate an intent to deceive or de-
fraud. Of these six, three require additionally an intent to affect or
depress or enhance the market value of securities of the company with
which the person prosecuted is associated;6 5 one requires an intent "to
deceive any person as to the real value of any shares or bonds" in such
company; 66 one provides that the statement or prospectus containing
the material representation which is false shall be "as to the value or af-
fecting the value of stocks or bonds" of a corporation; 7 and one simply
makes it a crime to make knowingly or willfully any fraudulent mis-
60. CONN. G x. STAT. (1930) § 6343; 1 IDAHO CODE ANx. (1932) § 17-4006; Mi. AN1 .
CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 27, § 170; MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 266, § 92; Mr,=. STAT.
(Mason, 1927) § 10389; MONT. REV. CODE (Choate, 1921) § 11446; NEB. CoAW. STAT.
(1929) § 28-1217; (a) N. Y. Pan. LAW (McKinney, 1917) § 952; (b) id. § 665; N. D.
Comp'. LAWS ANN. (1913) § 10015; OHIO CaR. LAWS (Patterson, 1929) § 13175; S. C.
CODE (1932) § 1238; S. D. ComP. LAWS (1929) § 4286; UTAH Comp. LAWS (1917) § 8371;
WASH. REV. STAT. (Remington, 1932) § 2642; Wyo. REV. STAT. (1931) § 32-907.
61. The Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Ohio, Washington, and Wyoming
statutes read "false or exaggerated."
62. Conn., Idaho, Minn., Mont., N. Y. (b), N. D., S. D., Utah, Wash., Wyo.
63. Conn., Minn., Wyo.
64. Connecticut is the one exception.
65. Md., Mass., Neb.
66. Ohio.
67. N. Y. (a).
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representation as to the capital, property or resources of the corpora-
tion.s
In the second category are ten state statutes. 9 Five of these are al-
most exactly similar to the English statute and capable of the same
broad interpretation." They concern prospectuses "false in a material
particular," require knowledge of the falsity, and provide for an "intent
to deceive or defraud any member, shareholder or creditor of said corpora-
tion (i. e. of which the accused is a director) or with intent to induce any
person to become a shareholder or partner therein." These five states
clearly afford punitive measures to force wide disclosures by corpora-
tions. Three other statutes within this category would seem to impose
so broad a liability as to test a prospectus as a whole for its impression."
On careful examination it will be seen that they create a criminal
liability for reports containing material statements that are false, and
also, alternatively, for "any untrue or willfully or fraudulently exag-
gerated prospectus" which is intended to produce or give, or has a ten-
dency to produce or give the shares of stock in such corporation a greater
value or a less apparent or market value than they really possess. It
would seem reasonable for the courts to hold, by analogy to English in-
terpretation and an application of common sense, that an "untrue pros-
pectus" is one which as a whole creates a false impression, however true
its details and inclusive statements, especially if it purports to set out a
true financial picture while in fact concealing it. The remaining two
statutes which may be construed to create broad liability are so excep-
tional in their wording as to warrant specific attention. One makes it
unlawful for a director to make "any false statement in regard to the
financial condition of such company." 72  If we regard a prospectus as a
statement in regard to the financial condition of a company, as seems
at least possible, then the adjective "false" would apply to a prospectus
taken in its entirety and a rule of impression might be allowable. The
other statute is still more vague and unsatisfactory. It lays down the
rule that "Intentional fraud ... in deceiving the public. . . in relation to
their liabilities, shall subject all directors . . . knowingly participating
therein to the penalties of a misdemeanor." 73 At least this is capable of
68. S. C.
69. Amiz. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 4806; CAL. PENr. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 564;
IOWA CODE (1931) § 8404; N=v. Cowx,. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) § 1765; N. J. Comm. STAT.
(1910) p. 1797; ORE. CODE: ANx. (1930) § 14-3109; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 18,
§ 2632; S. C. CODE (1932) § 1353; TEcx. CODE (1932) § 3764; Wis. STAT. (1931) §
343.37.
70. Nev., N. J., Ore., Pa., Wis.





being construed to cover means of deception, truthful in themselves but
intended to deceive.
While many of these state statutes directly imposing criminal liability
for false prospectuses thus possess potentially the adequacy of the
English Larceny Act under the interpretation of the Kylsant case, there
is not the slightest indication that these statutes have been pressed to
the limit of their scope. Only eleven prosecutions under all these sta-
tutes are on record. The basic explanation of this, to which support is
accorded by this paucity of prosecutions, lies in the ignorance of their
existence and in indifference to them, when their existence is known, on
the part of the public and legal authorities.74  Even as public indifference
nullified Blue Sky laws, so these laws have been rendered impotent
through public apathy.
Of the eleven prosecutions which have been undertaken under these
or similar earlier statutes, five turned upon the sufficiency and validity
of the indictments. In State v. Johnston7 the defendant had been con-
victed of publishing positive false statements concerning the financial
condition of the bank of which he was a director. The controlling sta-
tute provided,70 however, that the false statement must be made "to
some other person with an intention to deceive the person to whom the
false statement is made." On appeal it was held that damage need not
be alleged but that a new trial must be had since there was no allega-
tion as to whom the alleged false statement was made. Commonwealth
v. Rash77 held that an indictment under the Pennsylvania statute charg-
ing the defendant with making a false report of the corporation of which
he was president, was properly quashed because it failed to charge that
the statement related to the corporation and the evidence showed that it
related to his personal benefit and credit. In State v. Paulsen the ap-
pellate court refused to uphold a demurrer to an indictment of a director
which alleged a false statement but not that it was intended to give or
had a tendency to give a greater or less apparent value to the shares or
property than actually possessed. The statute under which the indict-
ment was brought 9 set up liability for "any statement which is false or
74. Only passing reference is made to these statutes in TEoM-psoN, CoRpoROrios (3d ed.
1927) § 5632; Cook, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) 2728; SPELLMAN, CORPORATE DmECTORS
(1931) 666. FIXEL, FALSE FIN ACrAL STATEMENTS (1924) C. 8, overlooks this type of
statute entirely, discussing only false-pretense and the concomitant false-statement-for-
credit statutes.
75. 149 S. C. 195, 146 S. E. 657 (1928).
76. S. C. CRI11. CODE (1922) § 244. This section, considerably altered, has been in-
corporated into the present Code, supra note 69.
77. 97 Pa. Sup. Ct. 495 (1929).
78. 21 Idaho 687, 123 Pac. 588 (1912).
79. IDAIO REV. ConE (1909) § 7128, repealed by Idaho Laws 1913, c. 117, but incor-
porated in substance in the present Code, supra note 60.
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wilfully exaggerated or which is intended to give or has a tendency to
give a greater or less apparent value to the shares or property than ac-
tually possessed," and the trial court ruling was that the "or" between
"exaggerated" and "which" should be read "and," thus requiring for
conviction both falsity and intention. State v. Merchant0 reversed the
judgment of a trial court which had allowed, under a statute,"' the con-
viction of a director for indorsing the publication to a person dealing with
the corporation of a willfully untrue report of operations. The evidence
was directed to showing that the report in question not only affected his
judgment in negotiating for a job with the company but in buying its
stock. Dealing in the corporation's stock in the market was held to
be not synonymous with dealing with the corporation and evidence as
to the former was deemed erroneously admitted. State v. O'Brien2
constituted an appeal from a conviction for making a false and exag-
gerated report of a corporation to its stockholders, contrary to a sec-
tion of the penal code then in force." There was no question but that a
false statement had been made by the defendant as to the surplus and
undivided profits of the company, but the grounds of the appeal were
that no intention to deceive had been alleged or proved and that, since
the evidence showed that the prosecutor was a shareholder at the time
of the issuance of the false statement, the offense disclosed came under
another section of the law which covered reports to shareholders and
required such intention. 4  The appeal was upheld on that ground.
The remaining six instances of prosecutions turn upon the validity of
exclusion and inclusion of evidence under indictments properly drawn,
containing all necessary allegations and properly related to the precise
statute establishing the crime alleged. In People v. Merritt' defend-
ant appealed from a conviction for issuing a false prospectus in violation
of a California statute,86 but the conviction was affirmed. 7 People v.
80. 48 Wash. 69, 92 Pac. 890 (1907).
81. Wash. Laws 1903, c. 93, § 1, repeaird by Wash. Laws 1927, c. 43, § 2. But see
the present Washington Code, supra note 60.
82. 143 Wash. 636, 255 Pac. 952 (1927).
83. See the present Washington Code, supra note 60.
84. See WASH. REV. STAT. (Remington, 1932) § 3829.
85. IS Cal. App. 58, 122 Pac. 839 (1912).
86. Cal. Laws 1905, c. 583. This provision, considerably altered but directed to the
same basic purpose, is now incorporated into the present Penal Code, supra note 69.
87. The prospectus purported to describe the holdings of Haiwee Pacific Oil Company
whose stock it was intended to propagandize for sale and of which the defendant wa
manager and secretary. This document stated: "We have since added to our holdings
until we now own 6,080 acres located about ten miles south of Owens Lake. This land
is made up of more certain indications of oil than any other field in California" It was
admitted at the trial that the title to this land remained in the United States government.
Defendant tried to justify the statements by giving evidence of making two locations un-
der the United States mineral laws, and objected to the evidence of additional work as
19331
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Youtz, 3 determined under the present California statute, was an appeal
from a conviction by a director of a holding company charged with is-
suing a report "false in a material particular," the same descriptive
phrase used in the English Larceny Act. The appeal was upheld. 0
State v. Ware0 was prosecuted under the present New Jersey statute,
which is similar to that of Engand. The defendant director of the North
American Realty Company was convicted of publishing a statement he
knew to be false in a material particular, the falsity consisting in the fact
that the prospectus of the company referred to two farms that had
been "purchased" when in reality there existed only agreements to buy
in installments to begin after the prospectus was issued. An appeal was
upheld.91 State v. Clements,92 prosecuted under the Montana statute,
involved the question whether or not a statement in a report that capi-
tal stock had been paid in to the extent of $100,000 made that report
one "containing any material statement which is false" within the statute
when the $100,000 consisted of only $5,000 in cash and the balance in
notes rather than $100,000 in cash, which the government claimed was
necessary to justify the statement. The defendant's contentions were
upheld.
State v. McDougal93 was a prosecution under the Iowa statute, which
is similar to that of Montana. The case turned upon whether or not
a statement in the financial report of the Associated Packing Com-
harmful, but on appeal it was ruled that no harm had been done the defendant as in the
absence of the evidence of additional work it would have been assumed that the only work
of protection done was in sinking two wells which would only have justified claims to 320
acres.
88. 26 Cal. App.,440, 147 Pac. 222 (1922).
89. The statement so alleged to be false was an item within the asset account "Stocks,
bonds, and secured notes-$558,360.48" consisting of stock in the Arizona Fire Insurance
Company carried at twice its par value. If this stock were worth only par, it was con-
ceded that the asset account would be overvalued by $200,000. The stock was not on
the market and the accused testified it was worth twice par but the jury found otherwise
and convicted. Appeal was based on the ground that, conceding the statement untrue in
fact, it was only an expression of opinion as to value and not a statement of definite fact,
but the court held that the value affixed was applied to property, the worth of which is
not generally of such a speculative nature as to excuse a statement in appraisal thereof as
a matter of opinion only.
90. 71 N. J. L. 53, 58 At. 595 (1904).
91. One ground of appeal was that evidence of defendant's association with the fraudu-
lent real estate company which was the predecessor of the North American was erroneous-
ly admitted to his prejudice and that no evidence was adduced to support a finding that he
knew of the false statements. A further ground of appeal, that it was necessary to allege
and prove that certain particular people entrusted their money or property to the cor-
poration, was not upheld as it was deemed sufficient if the allegation and proof related to
the public generally.
92. 37 Mont. 314, 96 Pac. 498 (1908).
93. 193 Iowa 286, 186 N. W. 929 (1922).
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pany for which the defendant was responsible, that the cost of selling
35,728 shares of stock was 4.032 per cent., was false and also if the
amount stated as cash in bank was false. The cash-in-bank account
proved to be correct, but the court excluded evidence of the state
directed to show that other assets were overvalued, and since the per-
centage cost of selling the stock was found by dividing the number of
shares into the balance sheet deficit, it was held on appeal that the
evidence had been wrongly excluded, as such evidence might have shown
that the deficit was larger than stated and therefore that the percentage
cost of selling the stock was misstated. In State v. Bolyn94 the defend-
ant director of a bank appealed a conviction under the South Carolina
law, for knowingly making a fraudulent misrepresentation as to the
resources of the bank. The particular false representation proved was
an exaggerated statement of the amount of the bank's overdrafts but, on
appeal, it was held that this false representation was proved by evidence
improperly admitted, and the conviction was reversed.
It will be noted at once that in all these cases the prosecution either
proved or tried to prove a direct false statement. Moreover, the convic-
tions only covered blatantly dishonest methods, i. e. gross overvaluation
of assets or unashamed lying without any pretence of subtlety. A few
traps in the matter of drawing up indictments are disclosed and rather
minute contribution to the law of evidence is made. But no intricate
and subtle financial wizardry on a large scale has been combatted by
prosecutors eager to extend the statutes to their remedial and puni-
tive limits, nor has there been any attempt to press upon the courts the
adoption of the "false impression" test which is now the law of Eng-
land.
Yet outright fraud is the least difficult to prosecute. Civil liability
of responsible directors is clear in such instances95 and so is their criminal
liability under these various statutes. Other statutes such as false pre-
tense statutes9 might cover frauds of directors upon prospectuses where
they have personally received money or property." Statutes covering
94. 143 S. C. 63, 141 S. E. 165 (1927).
95. See Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act (1933) 43 YALE L. J. 227.
96. See F=XEL, op. cit. supra note 74, Appendix A, where they are collected, and §§
93-95, where their general scope is discussed.
97. See Commonwealth v. Langley, 169 Mass. 89, 47 N. E. 511 (1897) (for officer of
corporation to sell its stock by false statements and personally to receive payment for it
constituted obtaining money by false pretenses); People v. Smith, 239 Ill. 91, 87 N. E. 885
(1909) (defendant directors of bank convicted of conspiracy to obtain by false pretenses,
defendants selling their bank stock through false statements as to the paid-in capital);
In re Crane, 40 Nev. 338, 163 Pac. 246 (1917) (officer of corporation making false state-
ment relating thereto and selling stock thereby to prosecutrix, convicted of obtaining money
by false pretenses and habeas corpus denied).
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false statements to obtain money and credit98 might also convict directors
in baldly dishonest transactions. 9  The federal statute prohibiting the
use of the mails to defraud'00 can serve as a means to convict where
prospectuses contain positive misstatements of fact. 10' Considerations
of what is a false representation under such prosecutions have even led
to investigation of the validity of valuation of stocks'0 2 and the setting
up of a rule that if dividends are paid there is a legal implication that
they have been earned, with consequent inquiry into accounting
methods."0 3 This legal implication is not to be minimized, for it might
be capable of leading to a conviction when dividends have been paid out
of capital or from stock premiums, 0 4 or from surplus created through un-
due appreciation of assets. 0 5
But there are methods to be considered other than those of direct
falsehood. Far more subtle and insidious practices are prevalent which
may not be labeled as false but which are distinctly misleading. While
other means and methods are available to those who would thus mis-
lead, the two media which best facilitate the myriad of deceptive though
perhaps truthful accounting practices are balance sheets and profit and
loss statements. The Federal Securities Act recognizes this fact in
vesting the Federal Trade Commission with power to require those is-
suing securities to submit balance sheets and profit and loss state-
ments, 0 6 as well as such additional information as the Commission
deems essential to the public interest.0 7 In this and in other respects,
the Securities Act is the most comprehensive of the American statutes.
98. See note 96, supra.
99. Sate v. Rommel, 3 N. J. Misc. 204, 127 Atl. 598 (1925) (defendant president
of corporation convicted of falsely stating corporation's assets to deceive creditors and
stockholders).
100. Pandolfo v. United States, supra note 54.
101. Moore v. United States, 2 F. (2d) 839 (C. C. A. 7th, 1924); Pandolfo v. United
States, supra note 54; Sparks v. United States, 241 Fed. 777 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917) ; Wilson
v. United States, 190 Fed. 427 (C. C. A. 2d, 1911).
102. Hyney v. United States, 44 F. (2d) 134 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930).
103. Gold v. United States; Corliss v. United States, both supra note 54.
104. In Gold v. United States, supra note 54, the court found dividends had not been
paid out of stock premiums and inferentially one may assume that it might have found
that dividends had not been earned, with resulting false representation and possible convic-
tion.
105. See Hill v. International Products Co., 129 N. Y. Misc. 25, 50, 51, 220 N. Y. Supp.
711, 735, 736 (Sup. Ct. 1925), where the court found unwarranted appreciation of assets
making certain dividends that Were paid unearned, though the defendants were absolved by
lack of connection with the consequent false representations and on other grounds. If, how-
ever, such responsible connection was shown with the statement as to dividends paid made
in a prospectus, the responsible directors might well be convicted of using the mails
to defraud.
106. Securities Act, supra note 1, Schedule A, (25) and (26).
107. Id. § 7.
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Yet despite its potentially extensive scope of liability, failure to adopt the
English test of the impression created by a prospectus or registra-
tion statement as a whole will materially influence the effectiveness of the
Act in imposing liability in all instances of deceptive truth. Content
can be given to its concepts only if prosecutions are brought, and the
substance of that content will depend upon the temper of the American
people and the inclinations of the judiciary. The fate of the statute
thus lies, fundamentally, within the power of prosecutor, judge and jury.
